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INTERVENING NEGLIGENCE: THE NEGATIVE
APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF LIABILITY
THE CONCEPT of proximate cause has been discussed and often ridi-
culed by legal writers for more than fifty years.' Yet, it continues to
vex the field of negligence and there seems to be no relief in prospect.2
That facet of proximate cause which deals with intervening acts is
responsible for much of the difficulty in this area of the law.8 An inter-
vening act is a cause which becomes operative in producing harm after
the occurrence of the first actor's negligent act or omission.4 Thus, in
a typical situation, the negligence of D creates a dangerous condition,
which is acted upon by X to produce harm to the plaintiff. Should D
be liable for the resulting harm? The question is usually phrased in
this manner: Should the intervening act of D be regarded as a "super-
seding" cause of the plaintiff's harm? The Restatement of Tortsr in
labelling superseding cause as "an act of a third person or other force
which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm
to another which his antecedent negligence is a. substantial factor in
bringing about... ],1 merely restates the problem. Much may depend
upon the nature of X's intervening act. The problem is both interesting
'See generally, Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 369
n. i (195o), for an exhaustive list of important literature in the field of proximate
cause prior to 195o. See especially, Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, So HARV. L. REV.
zz5, 2zz8-32 (1937) ; Carpenter, Proximate Cause (pts. 1-9), 14 So. CALIF. L. REV.
1, 115, 406 (1940); .5 id. 187, 304, 427 (1941) ; .6 id. x, 6x, 275 (1942) ; Green,
Merlo v. Public Service Co.-4 Study in Proximate Cause, 37 ILL. L. REV. 4±9
(1943) ; Morris, Duty, Negligence and Causation, iox U. PA. L. REV. 189 (.952).
'The conspicuous decline of leading articles on the subject during the past ten years
supports the conclusion that scholars in the field of proximate cause have all but aban-
doned the ambitious efforts to promote reform, made during the period from 19zo to
1940. The great bulk of material written since 195o comprises case notes and com-
ments dealing primarily with the situation in a single jurisdiction.
'See generally, Carpenter, Proximate Cause, x6 So. CALIF. L. REV. 61 (94); 7
U. KAN. L. REV. 539 (-959) 5 47 MIcH. L. REv. 1oz6 (x949); ig TEX. L. Ra. 93
(-940).
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 441() (1934); PROSSER, ToRn 766 (zd ed. 1955). Cf.,
z HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 2o.5 (1956).
'§440.
' Cf., Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 411-12, 285 P.2d 507, 514 (.955);
State v. Columbus Hall Ass'n, 75 N.D. 275, 285, 27 N.W.zd 664, 668 (947);
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Sutton, 208 Okla. 488, 494, 257 P.2d 307, 314 6953)
Scott v. Simms, 188 Va. 8o8, 817, 51 S.E.2d 250, 253 (-949).
INTERVENING NEGLIGENCE
and difficult when that act is a negligent one.7  The question then
becomes: Should the intervening negligence of X be regarded as a
"superseding cause," relieving D of liability? Although the courts are
divided on this question,8 they often hold that a negligent intervening
act is a superseding cause absolving the first negligent actor of liability.
Are the courts justified in reaching such a result?' ° Is there any justi-
fication for the whole concept of superseding cause?" One can best
answer these and other questions by a critical examination of cases in-
volving intervening negligence.
LIABILITY OF THE FIRST NEGLIGENT AcTOR AND ACTUAL CAUSATION
The logical starting point in dealing with the problem of interven-
ing negligence is actual causation, for it is abundantly clear that the first
actor should not be liable if his negligence was not an actual cause of
the plaintiff's injury. 2 Most courts, applying the "but for" test, experi-
ence little difficulty in finding actual causation. If there would have
been no harm to the plaintiff but for the negligence of D (the first
actor), then actual causation is said to exist. The "but for" test excludes
only those factors which are in no way related to the plaintiff's injury, 3
and it is of little benefit in determining who should be liable.' 4  One
must look beyond the "but for" test in order to restrict the ambit of
liability.
'See generally, Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. PA. L.
REv. izi (1937).
s See note 29 infra.
"[I]t can be stated as a general rule that ordinarily the intervention of a negligent
act as the independent and efficient cause of an injury operates to relieve one who has
been guilty of prior negligence from responsibility for the injury .... " 38 AM. JuR.,
Negligence § 72 0940. (Emphasis added.)
10 See note 19 infra.
2 Prosser, supra note x, at 398, discussing the superseding cause concept, states:
"[I]t is a question of whether the defendant shall be relieved of responsibility for the
result of his fault for the reason that another cause which has contributed to that result
is regarded as playing a more important, significant and responsible part. Again the
issue is merely one of policy which imposes liability, and any attempt to deal with it in
the language of the fact of causation can lead only to perplexity and bewilderment."
12 See Carpenter, Proximate Cause, S So. CALIF. L. REV. 427 (1941) PROSSER,
op. cit. supra note 4, at § 44.
13 See Carpenter, supra note iz, at 428-32.
14 "As a matter of practical necessity, legal responsibility must be limited to those
causes which are so close to the result, or of such significance as causes, that the law is
justified in making the defendant pay. But this limitation is not in any sense one of
causation 5 it is one of rules and policies which deny liability for what has clearly been
caused." Prosser, supra note i, at 375-
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Other courts,15 and the Restatement," require that the negligent
conduct of D be a "substantial factor" in producing harm to the plaintiff.
This standard, which includes in the ambit of liability only those acts
which are reasonably related to the plaintiff's harm, 17 achieves desirable
flexibility and, it is submitted, provides a more efficient framework for
limiting liability than does the "but for" test of causation.
LIABILITY OF THE FIRST NEGLIGENT ACTOR AND SUPERSEDING CAUSE
If the negligence of the first actor does not meet the applicable test
of actual causation ("but for" or "substantial factor"), then, of course,
he is not liable. The concept of superseding cause, however, assumes
that D's negligence was an actual cause and relieves him of liability
because of the existence of another causative factor, which is termed a
superseding cause.1" It is at this point that artificial methods of restrict-
ing D's liability are invoked. Instead of frankly admitting that causa-
tive negligence alone will not result in D's being held liable, courts
that apply the superseding cause concept indulge in terms such as "in-
tervening, efficient cause," "remote cause," or "condition and cause,""'
suggesting the presence or absence of actual causation, in determining
whether D should be liable for harm suffered by the plaintiff.20  Al-
though causation in fact, once established, should have no further bear-
ing on the question of liability, courts that talk in terms of superseding
cause usually submerge both actual causation and liability into the sea of
proximate cause, often with disastrous results.21
What factors induce a court to hold that an intervening negligent
act is, or is not, a superseding cause? The decisions show that a
15 Ferroggiaro v. Bowline, 153 Cal. App. zd 759, 315 P.zd 446 (1957); Cueno v.
Connecticut Co., 124 Conn. 647, 2 A.2d 270 (1938) ; Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich. 443,
70 N.W.zd 805 (1955) ; Champicux v. Miller, z55 S.W.zd 794 (MO. 1953); Dunham
v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 104 N.E.zd 872 (1952); Walton v. Blauert,
256 Wis. 125, 40 N.W.2d 545 (1949); Phelps v. Woodward Constr. Co., 66 Wyo. 33,
204 P.zd 179 (1949). See 7 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 2o.6 n. 54
and accompanying text.
8§ 433 (1948).
11 Cf., RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 431, comment a (1948); PROSSER op. cit. supra note
4, at zzx-zz. But cf., Carpenter, supra note 12, at 439.
18 See note 6 supra.
1L See, e.g., Fiechter v. City of Corbin, 254 Ky. 178, 71 S.W.zd 423 (934)
Frerichs v. Eastern Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 154 Neb. 777, 49 N.W.2d 619 (1951) ;
Johnson v. Cone, 112 Vt. 459, z8 A.zd 384 (1942).
"
0 See note Ii supra.
21 See, e.g., Workman v. Howard Zinc Corp., 97 Cal. App. 418, 425, z8 P.zd 43,
48 (1950) (defining dependent cause) ; Peoples v. Fulk, 2zo N.C. 635, IS S.E.zd 147
(942) ; Sturdevant v. Kent, 32Z P.zd 408 (Okla. 1958) (condition not the proximate
cause); Listino v. Union Paving Co., 386 Pa. 32, 124 A.zd 83 (1956); Jowett v.
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holding either way may be the result of numerous considerations,
only some of which are articulated in the opinions.2 The result is
invariably rationalized in terms of causation when, actually, the factors
considered are foreign to that concept. The following sections attempt
to analyze these rationalizations and their underlying reasons.
THE CONCEPT OF FORESEEABILITY APPLIED TO
NEGLIGENT INTERVENTION
The concept of foreseeability is used in all states in determining the
liability of the first negligent actor.23  It is necessary, however, to dis-
tinguish between two applications of the foreseeability concept: (I)
foreseeability of harm, which, as an element of negligence,24 is unre-
lated to the actual causation issue,25 and (2) foreseeability of intervening
act, which also has nothing to do with actual causation, but has been.
invoked as a criterion for determining liability (i.e., proximate cause).28
Pennsylvania Power Co., 383 Pa. 330, 118 A.2d 452 (1955) ; De Luca v. Manchester
Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 380 Pa. 484, 112 A.2d 372 (1953) (negligence of'de-
fendant created "passive background").
'2 "One eminent authority has said to determine the question of proximate cause, it
must be based 'upon mixed questions of logic, common sense, justice, policy and prece-
dent.'" Jaggers v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 34. F. Supp. 667, 669 (M.D. Tenn.
1940).
23 Foreseeability of harm is necessary only when the harm is an indirect or remote
result of negligence of the defendant. Dixon v. Kentucky Util. Co., 295 Ky. 32, 174
S.W.2d 'g (1943).
24 Cf., 2 HARPER & JAMES, Op. Cit. supra note 4, at §§ .6.9, 2o.5.
2r "[F]oreseeability has no place when we are considering proximate or legal cause.
Foreseeability, however, is an element . . . when the question of negligence is being
considered." Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 368 Pa. 423, 428-29, 84 A.2d 289, 292 (1951).
Many jurisdictions, however, include the question of foreseeability of harm within the
framework of proximate cause. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 236 F.2d 233 (8th
Cir. 1956) i United States v. White, 211 F.zd 79 (9 th Cir. 1954.) 5 Dixon v. Kentucky
Util. Co., 295 Ky. 32, 174 S.W.2d 19 (i943) ; Dickerson v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.,
365 Mo. 738, 286 S.W.2d 82o (1956); Gaines v. Property Servicing Co., 276 S.W.2d
169 (Mo. App. 2955); Moore v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 301 S.W.zd 395 (MO. App.
1957) i Banks v. Shepard, 230 N.C. 86, 52 S.E.2d 225 (i94)5 Moyers v. Ogle, 24
Tenn. App. 62, 138 S.W.2d 637 (1940) 5 Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Wafer,
Zo8 S.W.2d 614- (Tex. Civ. App. 194.8).
"See Milwaukee Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1876) ; Person v. Cauldwell-Win-
gate Co., 176 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1949); Edwards v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 885
(M.D. Ga. 1958) 5 Manion v. Chicago R. Is. & Pac. Ry., 1z Ill. App. 2d 1, x38
N.E.2d 98 (1956)i Indiana Servicing Corp. v. Johnston, 34 N.E.2d 157 (Ind. App.
1941) i Leveillee v. Wright, 300 Mass. 382, x5 N.E.2d 247 (1938) ; Riddle v. Artis,
243 N.C. 668, 92 S.E.2d 894 (1956) ; Hart v. Curry, 238 N.C. 448, 78 S.E.zd 170
(1953) ; Smith v. Grubb, 238 N.C. 665, 78 S.E.2d 598 (1953)-i Mudrich v. Standard
Oil Co., 153 Ohio St. 31, 90 N.E.2d 859 (i95o)5 Spicers, Inc. v. Rudd, 299 Okla.
576, 188 P.2d 692 (1947).
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Courts are often prone to confuse the two applications or to use them
interchangeably as a single element of proximate cause.27
The concept of foreseeability of intervening act is applied in most
states. 28 It is said that a reasonably foreseeable intervening act is not
a superseding cause. While the test of foreseeability is more stringent
in some jurisdictions,29 most courts hold that it is not necessary that the
actual intervening act should have been foreseeable. Rather, this re-
quirement is satisfied if the first negligent actor, exercising reasonable
care, should have foreseen that an intervening act would occur. 0
" See Nichols v. City of Phoenix, 68 Ariz. 124, 202 P.zd 2o (1949) ; Ferrogglaro
v. Bowline, 415 P.2d 446 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Szymanaska v. Equitable Life
Ins. Co., 37 Del. 277, 183 Atl. 309 (1936) ; Parsons v. Grant, 95 Ga. App. 431, 98
S.E.zd 229 (1957) ; Neering v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.zd 497 (1943);
Haskell v. Perkins, 16 Ill. App. zd 428, 148 N.E.zd 6z5 (2958); Dodds v. Chicago
Trans. Authority, 9 III. App. zd 388, 132 N.E.2d 8x6 (1956); Knaus Truck Lines, Inc.
v. Commercial Freight Lines, 238 Iowa 1356, 29 N.W.zd 204 (1947); Noel v. Men-
ninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.zd 934 (1954); Lane v. Atlantic Works, 222
Mass. 136 (1872); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 2z2 Miss. 378, 73 So.
2d 249 (1954) ; Curtis v. Jacobson, 242 Me. 352, 54 A.zd 52o (1947) ; Champieux v.
Miller, 255 S.W.zd 794 (Mo. 1953); Egenberger v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating
& Milling Co., 164 Neb. 704, 83 N.W.zd 523 (1957); Menth v. Breeze Corp., 4
W.Va. 428, 73 A.2d 183 (195o); Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 285 P.2d
507 (1955); Foley v. State, 265 App. Div. 682, 41 N.Y.S.zd 256 (1943), Faircloth
v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 247 N.C. 19o, oo S.E.zd 328 (1957); Hayes v. City of Wil-
mington, 243 N.C. 525, 92 S.E.2d 673 (1956); German v. Muskingom Valley Trans.
Co., 94 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio C.P. i95o); Yellow Trans. Freight Lines v. Allred, 302
P.2d 985 (Okla. 1956) ; Stark v. Lehigh Foundries, 388 Pa. i, 13o A.2d 123 (1957) ;
Floyd v. Turgeon, 68 R.I. 228, 27 A.zd 330 (1942) ; Bradley v. Fowler, 210 S.C. 231,
42 S.E.2d 234 (1947); Friendship Tel. Co. v. Russom, 309 S.W.zd 416 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2957); Rader v. Nashville Gas Co., 268 S.W.zd 114 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953);
Kimbriel Produce Co. v. Mayo, i8o S.W.ad 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Johnson v.
Cone, 112 Vt. 459, 28 A.zd 384 (1942); Selfe v. Hale, 193 Va. 543, 69 S.E.2d 434
(952).
28See, e.g., Hickert v. Wright, 282 Kan. 100, 319 P.zd 252 (1957); Johnson v.
Cone, supra note 27.
29 See 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. Cit. supra note 4, § 2o.5 at 1149; PROSSER, op. Cit.
supra note 4, at 268. Some courts, and the Restatement, invoke a more liberal test,
from the plaintiff's point of view. See, e.g., Hayes v. City of Wilmington, 243 N.C.
525, 91 S.E.2d 673 (1956); Adam v. Los Angeles Trans. Lines, 317 P.2d 642 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Knaus Truck Lines v. Commercial Freight Lines, 238 Iowa
1356, 29 N.W.zd 204 (1947); Champieux v. Miller, 255 S.W.zd 794 (Mo. 1953);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 447. "[T'he decided modern trend of authority, both in Eng-
land and America, has been to make the liability of the defendant turn upon whether
the intervening human action was foreseeable and to hold the defendant liable where
in the retrospect the intervening act did not appear to be particularly unusual or
extraordinary." Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. PA. L.
REV. 12, 125 (2937).
L:See Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 2933);
Lebeck v. Win. A. Jarvis, Inc., 45 F-. Supp. 7o6 (E.D. Pa. x956); Cuneo v. Con-
Vol, 196o; 88] INTERVENING NEGLIGENCE
In those states which apply the substantial factor test in determining
actual causation, foreseeability of intervening act is not usually re-
quired."' One might expect that those states applying the "but for"
test of actual causation would require foreseeability of intervening act
to hold D liable. However, many of these states do not require this
foreseeability under some circumstances, as where the negligence of D
is dearly a significant factor in producing harm. 2 The decisions exhibit
a definite trend away from requiring foreseeability of intervening act
under all circumstances. In fact, there is a substantial trend, particu-
larly in the Pacific and southwestern states, away from requiring fore-
seeability of intervening act in any case.33 A result of this movement
is shown in recent cases which evidence greater liberality in holding the
first negligent actor liable.
In summary, the foreseeability picture at present is as follows:
I. Foreseeability of harm and foreseeability of intervening act are
often confused.
2. Foreseeability of intervening act is usually required in cases in
which the negligence of D and the resulting harm are not closely
related.
necticut Co., 124. Conn. 64.7, 2 A.zd 2zo (1938); Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich. 443,
70 N.W.zd 805 (1955); Coyne v. Pittsburgh Rys. 393 Pa. 326, 141 A.2d 830 (1958).
But see, Champieux v. Miller, 255 S.W.zd 794 (Mo. 1953).
"Wilson v. Goscinske, 233 F.2d 759 (6th Cir. 1956) (normal reaction); Eberhart
v. Abshire, x58 F.zd 24 (yth Cir. 1946) (set in motion by); Gibson v. Garcia, 96
Cal. App. 2d, 681, z16 P.zd xis (195o) (substantial factor) ; Parker v. City and County
of San Francisco, 158 Cal. App. 2d 597, 323 P.zd so8 (1958) (acts concur in pro-
ducing harm); Hoffman v. Barker, 79 Idaho 339, 317 P.zd 335 (1957) (concurrent
negligence); Cassity v. Brady, i8z Kan. 381, 321 P.2d 171 (1958) (primary negli-
gence) ; Louisville & N. Ry. v. Stephens, 298 Ky. 328, I8Z S.W.zd 447 (1944) (set in
motion by); Holmberg v. Villaume, 158 Minn. 442, 197 N.W. 849 (1924) (directly
contributes); Thelen v. Spilman, 251 Minn. 89, 86 N.W.zd 700 (957) (so near in
time); Continental So. Lines v. Klass, 217 Miss. 2d 795, 65 So. 2d 575 (x953) (set
into operation by); Gaines v. Property Servicing Co., 276 S.W.zd 169 (Mo. App.
1955) (combines with intervening cause).
" United States v. Kelly, 236 F.zd 233 (8th Cir. x956) ; Lebeck v. Win. A. Jarvis,
Inc., 145 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Pa. 1956) ; Dixon v. Kentucky Util. Co., 295 Ky. 32,
174 S.W.2d 19 (1943)5 Banks v. Shepard, 23o N.C. 86, 5z S.E.2d 2 5 (949) ;
Moyers v. Ogle, 24 Tenn. 682, 148 S.W.2d 637 (1940) ; Southwestern Greyhound Lines
v. Wafer, 2o8 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
C" f., Parker v. City & County of San Francisco, 158 Cal. App. 2d 597, 323 P.zd
o8 (i958) i Urland v. French, 141 Cal. App. zd 278, 296 P.2d 568 (1956); Russell
v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 466, 305 P.2d 740 (1956) ; Moore v. St. Louis S.W.
Ry., 301 S.W.2d 395 (Mo. App. Ct. 1957); Dulley v. Berkley, 304 S.W.2d 878 (Mo.
1957); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Sutton, 2o8 Okla. 488, 257 P.zd 307 (1953);
Levitan v. Banniza, 34 Tenn. App. 176, 236 S.W.2d 90 (i95i) ; Southwestern Grey-
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3- Foreseeability of intervening act is not usually required in cases
in which the negligence of D is a substantial factor in producing
harm.
4. The modern trend is away from requiring foreseeability of inter-
vening act in all cases.
OTHER RATIONALIZATIONS USED TO RELIEVE THE FIRST
NEGLIGENT ACTOR OF LIABILITY
In addition to foreseeability, courts use a number of other "rules""
of proximate cause in order to determine whether the first negligent
actor should be liable. These "rules," of course, have nothing to do
with causation, but are used to justify the decisions. The factors
actually considered by the courts are subsumed under the "cloak of
proximate cause," resulting in confusion and perplexity."5
In cases in which the negligence of D is not "closely connected" to
the resulting harm because of lapse of time or presence of substantial
intervening acts, courts which hold that the first actor's negligence was
not a proximate cause emphasize the "remoteness"130 of the causal rela-
tion between the actor's conduct and the resulting harm. Labels,T such
as "sole cause" and "the proximate cause," are indulged. The rule
followed by most courts, that an intervening act is not a superseding
cause if it was reasonably foreseeable, is ignored, 88 or a strict and un-
reasonable foreseeability requirement is invoked which makes it vir-
tually impossible to hold that the intervening act was reasonably fore-
hound Lines v. Wafer, 2o8 S.W.zd 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) ; Phelps v. Woodward
Constr. Co., 66 Wyo. 33, 204 P.2d I79 (1949).
" The word "rules" is enclosed in quotation marks in order to distinguish rationali-
zations discussed here from rules that have been suggested by legal scholars. See e.g.,
RESTATEMENT, TORTs, §§ 443, 447-49; Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining
Proximate Cause, 20 CALiU. L. REV. 471 (1932).
3 5 Prosser, supra note 1, at 398.
Fiechter v. City of Corbin, 254 Ky. 178, 71 S.W.zd 423 (1934), Huffman v.
Sorenson, 194 Va. 932, 76 S.E.zd 183 (953).
"'Frerichs v. Eastern Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 154 Neb. 777, 49 N.W.zd 619
(i95i); Faircloth v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 247 N.C. x9o, oo S.E.2d 328 (1957);
Troxler v. Central Motor Lines, 24o N.C. 420, 82 S.E.2d 342 (1954); Sturdevant v.
Kent, 322 P.2d 4o8 (Okla. 1958).
"Lang v. New York Cent. R.R., 255 U.S. 455 (1921) 5 Smith v. United States, x55
F. Supp. 6o5 (E.D. Va. 1957); Hooks v. Hudson, 237 N.C. 695, 75 S.E.2d 758
(1953); Garner v. Pittman, 237 N.C. 328, 75 S.E.zd 111 (1953); Goodwin v. Nixon,
236 N.C. 632, 74 S.E.2d 24 (1953) 5 Clark v. Lambreth, 235 N.C. 578, 70 S.E.2d 8z8
(1952) ; Murray v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 218 N.C. 392, 11 S.E.zd 326 (1940), Listino
v. Union Paving Co., 386 Pa. 32, 124 A.2d 83 (1956); Huffman v. Sounson, x94 Va.
932, 76 S.E.ad 183 (1953); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Hartwell, 142 W. Va. 318, 95
S.E.zd 462 (1956).
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seeable. 9 In cases of this type the court is in effect invoking a crude
substantial factor test which fails to limit itself to the question of causa-
tion. There are also other factors, such as the nature of the inter-
vening act,4 ' the scope of the first actor's duty," and the type of harm
suffered by the plaintiff as compared to the nature of the actor's negli-
gence.43 Although these factors are seldom suggested and rarely spelled
out, they are incorporated into the nebulous concept of proximate cause.
Opinions which deal with liability in this manner are often incoherent"
and sometimes incomprehensible.4 5
In a second type of fact situation, the negligence of the first actor is
more readily identified as a cause of the plaintiff's injury. Yet an even
more .untenable holding results from judicial efforts to relieve the first
negligent actor of liability. Meaningless phrases, such as "efficient
cause,"4. "superseding cause,"47 "moving cause,"48 "independent and
dependent cause," 49 "condition and cause," 50  and "passive," 5 1 or
"1static' 52 negligence, frequently appear in these opinions. The negli-
"See Indiana Serv. Corp. v. Johnston, o9 Ind. App. 204, 34. N.E.zd 157 (194) 5
Dixon v. Kentucky Util. Co., 295 Ky. 32, 174 S.W.2d ,9 (1943); Robinson v. Butler,
226 Minn. 491, 33 N.W.2d 8z (1942) ; Rader v. Nashville Gas Co., 37 Tenn. App.
6zi, 268 S.W.zd 114. (954.) ; Meyette v. Canadian Pac. Ry., io Vt. 345, 6 A.zd 33
(1939). See also, MORRIS, TORTS 191 (1953).
,0 Accord, PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 256.
"'See note 55 infra.
" Cf., PROSSER, Selected Topics on the Law of Torts, 221-34 (954).
"Cf., MORRIS, op0. cit. supra note 39, at § 4; GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 38-152
(1930). PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 42, at 209-15.
" See Waterloo Savings Bank v. Waterloo Cedar Falls & N.R.R., 244 Iowa 1364,
6o N.W.2d 572 (I953); Karpf v. Adams, 237 N.C. xo6, 74 S.E.zd 325 0953)5
Listino-v. Union Paving Co., 386 Pa. 32, 124 A.2d 83 (1956).
"See Lang v. New York Cent. R.R., 255 U.S. 455 (.92); Haney v. Town of
Lincolnton, 207 N.C. 28z, 176 S.E. 573 (1934); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Hartwell,
J4 z W::Va. 318, S.E.2d 462 (1956).
+ J,.Lurnd v. Minnesota St. P. Ry., 250 Minn. 55o, 86 N.W.2d 78 (-957); Duke v.
Missouri, Pac. R.R., 303 S.W.zd 613 (Mo. -957).
"'Cf., Listino v. Union Paving Co., 386 Pa. 32, 124 A.2d 83 (.956) and cases
cited -therein; Scott v. Simms, i88 Va. 8o8, 51 S.E.2d 250 (1949).
.. Ecker v. Union Pac. R.R., 164 Neb. 744, 83 N.W.zd 551 0957).
"Smith v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 6o5 (E.D. Va. 1957); Workman v. Howard
Zi~le Corp., 97 Cal. App. 2d 418, 218, P.2d 43. (1950) ; Carpenter, supra note 34, at
4+84.: -
."5Drohan v. Standard Oil Co., x6a F.2d 761 ( 7 th Cir. 1948) ; Jaggers v. South-
eastern Greyhound Lines, 34 F. Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1940) ; Frerichs v. Eastern
Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 154 Neb. 7,77, 49 N.W.7d 619 (95); Sturdevant v. Kent,
3z2 P.qd 4 8 (Okla. 1958); Nashville C.,& St. L. Ry. v. Harrell, 2i Tenn. App. 353,
o $.S.W.2d 1032 (1937); Chancey v. Van Luit, 306 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.
'957).
"Lancaster v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 219 N.C. 679, 14 S.E.2d 82o (941).
"Nichols v. City of Phoenix, 68 Ariz. 124, 202 P.zd 201 (1949) ; Georgia N. Ry.
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gence of D is often labelled "passive," creating only a "condition,"
which, when acted upon by intervening negligence, causes the plaintiff's
harm." Two well-known propositions, the doctrine of "insulated negli-
gence"54 and the "last wrongdoer" rule,55 are well-known examples of
the use of these meaningless phrases in restricting liability.
In a third group of cases, the question whether the first actor's con-
duct was a proximate cause turns on the culpability of the intervening
act.56 The test enunciated in the well-known case of Kline v. Moyer57
involves such a limitation on the liability of D and has been applied
in at least ten jurisdictions.5" Under this rule of thumb, if a second
negligent actor becomes aware of the existence of a potential danger
created by the negligence of D, and he thereafter, by an independent
act of negligence, brings about the harm to the plaintiff, then D is re-
lieved of liability.59 While this rule sounds deceptively competent, in
v. Hathcock, 93 Ga. App. 72, 91 S.E.zd 145 (1955)-
"See 65 C.J.S. Negligence § i o n. 9! (195o). But see, Northern Ind. Trans. Co.
v. Burk, 288 Ind. x6z, 89 N.E.zd 905 (1950).
"4 This method of restricting liability is employed extensively in North Carolina.
See generally, Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Hunt, 163 F.zd I 17 (4th Cir. x947);
Alford v. Washington, 238 N.C. 694, 78 S.E.zd 915 (1953); Lancaster v. Atlantic
Greyhound Corp., 219 N.C. 679, 14 S.E.zd 82o (i94i) i Murray v. Atlantic C.L.R.R.,
ziS N.C. 392, 405, ix S.E.2d 326, 335 (1940) (dissenting opinion).
"Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Hartwell, 142 W. Va. 38, 95 S.E.zd 462 (1956), is
the only recent case found which invokes the rule. "The rule that the last wrongdoer
only will be held responsible . .. finds little support." Note, 9 MINN. L. REV. 273,
274 (1925). See generally, Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86
U. PA. L. Rav. x12, z24-26 (1937) ; 76 U. PA. L. REV. 720 (1928).
" Many courts have emphasized culpability by distinguishing between an intervening
act which is malum in se and one which is malum prohibitum, relieving the first negli-
gent actor in the former situation. See Pittman v. Staples, 95 Ga. App. 187, 97 S.E.zd
630 (1957). The modern trend favors holding D liable, even though the intervening
act is malum in se, if the intervening criminal act was reasonably foreseeable. See
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. zd 696 (-957)1 Ney v.
Yellow Cab Co. z Ill. App. 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 0954).
1 325 Pa. 357, 191 Atl. 43 0937).
"Georgia N.E. Ry. v. Hathcock, 93 Ga. App. 72, 91 S.E.zd 45 (i955); Sims v.
Hallett Constr. Co., 247 Minn. 339, 77 N.W.2d 54 (1956); E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378, 73 So. 2d 249 (19.4)5 Duke v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
303 S.W.2d 613 (MO. 1957); Meyer v. Board of Educ., 9 NJ. 46, 86 A.zd 761
(1952) Rankin v. S.S. Kresge Co., 59 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Va. 1945); Calder v.
Gresham, 224 N.C. 402, 30 S.E.zd 312 (944); Jeloszewski v. Sloan, 375 Pa. 360,
oo A.2d 480 (1953); Chadwick v. Popadick, 390 Pa. 51, 136 A.2d 87 (1957)
(applying the converse of the rule to hold the first negligent actor liable) ; Levitan v.
Banniza, 3t Tenn. App. 176, 236 S.W.2d 90 (195 1) ; Hillyard v. Utah Ry. Prods. Co.,
i Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (953); Edgerton v. Norfolk So. Bus Corp., 187 Va.
642, 47 S.E.2d 409 (1948).
" Contra, 65 C.J.S. Negligence § xl n. 47 (1950).
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application it is little more than a re-enactment of the often-denounced
rule that the person whose wrongful act most nearly precedes the injury
shall alone be liable. 0
These rules, based on the nature of the intervening act, are obviously
far removed from principles of causation. In deciding that the negli-
gence of D was not a proximate cause of the resulting harm, the court
ignores the part played by D in causing the harm, looking only to the
nature of the intervening act. This test of proximate cause is at best
negative."' It is submitted that more logical methods of determining
liability are available."
REASONS GIVEN FOR HOLDING THE FIRST NEGLIGENT ACToR LIABLE
In direct contrast to the cases in which courts have had to resort to
fictions to relieve D of liability are the majority of cases which allow
recovery, even though still talking in terms of proximate cause. These
cases can also be conveniently discussed according to the factual situation
presented.
A large number of cases involve situations in which the negligence
of D is not "closely connected" to the resulting harm. As seen above,
courts bent on restricting the scope of liability in factual situations of
this type will term the negligence of D a "remote cause" and absolve
him of liability. In the majority of cases, however, in which D is held
liable, his negligent act was, in fact, a primary causative factor"3 from
which later events followed, so that the intervening act and the resulting
harm can be termed "natural and probable. 64  It is said that the negli-
gence of D "sets in motion" 5 the intervening act, or that it "increases
Co See note 54. supra. The Kline v. Moyer rule differs from the last wrongdoer rule
in that it requires that the second negligent actor be aware of the danger. Because of
this, others believe that the rule is a variant of the doctrine of last clear chance.
"I Cf., 7 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 4, at 144; 9 MINN. L. REV. 273, 277
(192s).
CO See note sx z infra.
Ca Cf., Clinger v. Duncan, 166 Ohio St. 16, 141 N.E.2d 156 (957)-
"Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 285 P.ad 507 (1955); Yellow Transit
Freight Lines, Inc. v. Allred, 302 P.ad 985 (Okla. x956). Several states use the term
natural and probable, or a variation thereof, in instructions to juries. See generally,
3 BRANSON, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 1230 (1936 Supp., 1958). No judicial attempt
to define these terms has been found.
" Eberhart v. Abshire, 158 F.ad 24 ( 7 th Cir. 1946) (Ind.) 5 Loftin v. McCrainie,
47 So. 2d 298 (Fla. x95o ) 5 Parsons v. Grant, 95 Ga. App. 431, 98 S.E.zd 2i9 (1957);
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Stephens, 298 Ky. 328, 18Z S.W.2d 4¢7 (1944); Pfaehler v.
Ten Cent Taxi Co., 198 S.C. 476, iS S.E.2d 331 (1942) ; Continental So. Lines Inc.
v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 575 (1953) ; 38 AM. JU. Negligence § 69 (194).
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rhe likelihood"" of such an act, or that it "induces"0 7 the subsequent
cause. The "normal reaction""8 intervening act usually falls within
this category, as does the factual situation in which the type of harm
that resulted was reasonably foreseeable.69 Because most jurisdictions
apply the "but for" test of actual causation, a further determination
that D's act was such a primary cause will invariably impose liability.
It should be noted, however, that most courts refuse to discuss the
question in terms of liability, talking instead in terms of proximate
cause.70
The Restatement, though requiring that D's negligence be a sub-
stantial factor in producing harm,71 supports this proximate cause 2
approach to the question of liability. In allowing the plaintiff to re-
cover from D if the intervening negligent act was a "normal response"7 8
to the situation created by the negligence of D, the Restatement adds
that "normal is used as the opposite of.,highly extraoi'dinary and not
in its more customary sense of standard or usual."74  Another section
invokes an extremely liberal foreseeability of intervening act require-
ment, imposing liability upon D if his negligence was a substantial factor
in producing harm and: 5
"' Kisor v. Tulsa Rendering Co., 113-F, Supp. io (W.D. Ark. 1953); Spicers, Inc.
v. Rudd, 599 Okla. 576, 188 P.zd 692 (1948).
"'McClelland v. Interstate Trans. Lines, x4.2 Neb. 439, 6 N.W.zd 384 (942)
Egenberger v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating and Milling Co., 164 Neb. 704, 83
N.W.zd 523 (957).
"Wilson v. Goscinske, 233 F.zd 759 (6th Cir. 1956); Hill v. Wilson, zx6 Ark.
179, 224 S.W.2d 797 (1949); Friendship Tel. Co. v. Russom, 309 S.W.2d 416 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1957).
"Foley v. State, 265 App5. Div. 682, 4z N.Y.S.zd 256 (943). "[I]f the de-
fendant's conduct exposes persons in the class to which plaintiff belongs to a foreseeable
.risk of injury, and his act or omission contributes substantially to injury of that nature
actually occurring, he may be held liable notwithstanding the fact that an unforeseeable
independent intervening act is a concurring cause." (Emphasis added.) Gibson v.
Garcsa, 96 Cal. App. 2d 681, 684, 216 P.2d 119, 121 (1950). Accord, Johnson v.
Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1933).
"See, e.g., Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134 (zd cir. 195i ) ; Ferroggiaro v.
Bowline, 153 Cal. App. 2d 159, 315 P.2d 446 (1957); McEvoy v. American Pool
Corp., 32 Cal. 2d 195, 195 P.2d 783 (1948); Hoffmann v. Barker, 79 Idaho 339, 317
P.zd 33 5 (1957)5 Trapp v. Standard Oil Co., 176 Kan. 39, z69 P.2d 469 (954);
Moyers v. Ogle, 148 S.W.2d 637 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).
"'RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 43 1 (a).
"RESTATEMENT, §431, employs the term legal cause." Phelps v. Woodward
Constr. Co., 66 Wyo. 33, 204. P.2d 179 (1949), follows the Restatement position and
contains a good discussion of the problem.
ESTArEMENT, TORTS §§ 443, 447 (c).
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 443 cbmment b.
"RisTwrEliENT, TORTS § 447 (a) (b).
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(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a
third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the
third person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that
a third person had so acted.
A third section of the Restatement which has been received favorably
by the courts invokes liability "if the reasonable likelihood that a third
person may act in a [negligent] manner is the hazard or one of the
hazards which makes the actor's [D's] conduct negligent .... 11
The Restatement, then, repeats the proximate cause approach em-
ployed by the courts, but it more openly concludes that liability results
when an act is labeled a "proximate cause" of the plaintiff's harm. The
Restatement, in effect, uses the terms synonymously.77
If a court dealing with a "remote" cause situation finds that the
negligent act of D was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm, or even
if it immediately concludes that D is liable, the harm suffered by the
plaintiff is, in effect, held to be a risk that should be borne by D. Legal
scholars are in agreement on this point." Professor Green states the
problem thus °
[I] t should be dear that it is in connection with the problem of defining the
scope of protection given to any interest that the courts are prone to seek
"/ RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 449.
"The Restatement provisions represent great progress in this area of negligence.
Sections 447 and 339 especially have been followed by a substantial number of
courts. The following cases are in accord with § 447 of the Restatement. .Bowser
v. Publicker Indust., iox F. Supp. z86 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 192 F.2d 9 (3rd Cir.
1951 ) ; Hill v. Wilson, z16 Ark. 179 , 224 S.W.zd 797 (1949) i Warner v. Santa Cata-
lina Is. Co., 44 Cal. 2d 31o, 282 P.zd 12 (1955) 5 Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich. 443, 70
N.W.2d 805 (sS); Graham v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 24o N.C. 338, 82 S.E.2d 346
(iqS9) 5 Rattley v. Powell, 223 N.C. 134, 25 S.E.2d 448 (194-3), Stark v. Lehigh
Foundries, 388 Pa. 1, 13o A.zd 123 (957) Gies v. Consol. Freightways, 40 Wash.
2d 488, 244 P.2d 248 (1952); Dombrowski v. Albrent Freight & Storage Corp., z64
Wis. 440, 59 N.W.2d 465 (1953)i Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.zd 134 (7d Cir.
1951) 5 Nichols v. City of Phoenix, 68 Ariz. 124, 2o P.±d ±ox (949)5 Richardson
v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955); Abbott v. New York Pub. Library,
263 App. Div. 314, 32 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1942) 5 Herring v. Springbrook Packing Co.
Co-op., z08 Ore. 191, 299 P.2d 6o4 (1956)5 Kimbriel Produce Co. v. Mayo, ISo
S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). Accord, McClelland v. Interstate Trans. Lines,
142 Neb. 439, 6 N.W.2d 384 (194z) 5 See also, 65 C.J.S. Negligence § xx 1.43
0so).
-SSee PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2765 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 1143. Cf., Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, in SELECTED Toics ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 7x6 (1954).
7 GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 39 (r927).
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relief in that vague conception of legal cause or proximate cause as opposed to
causal relation as we speak of it generally.
A second group of cases which holds the first negligent actor liable
involves fact situations in which his negligence is more closely related
to the plaintiff's harm.80  These cases may be compared with those in
which the first actor was absolved of liability because his negligence
was "passive" and therefore not a "proximate" cause. The present
cases, however, in allowing the first negligent actor to be held liable,
deal with the issue squarely--in terms of actual causation. It is said
that the negligence of D was a substantial factor in producing harm,81
or that his negligence continued to operate and combined 2 with the
intervening act to cause harm, or that his negligence contributed88 to
the plaintiff's injury. The fact that under the "but for" test the second
negligent act is also a cause is properly regarded as immaterial, so long
as it can be said that no harm would have resulted but for the negligence
of D. 4
An analysis of cases of this type, in which the first actor is held liable
because his negligence was an actual cause of the resulting harm, leads
to the conclusion that these cases fall within the conception of legal
(proximate) cause offered by the Restatement. The Restatement de-
dares that the negligence of the first actor is a legal cause if:88
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and
" See, e.g., Waterloo Savings Bank v. Waterloo C.F. & No. R.R., 244 Iowa 2d
1364, 6o N.W.zd 572 (1953); Coyne v. Pittsburgh Rys. 393 Pa. 426, 141 A.ad 830
(958).
" Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64 F.zd 193 (6th Cir. 1933), Cuneo
v. Connecticut Co., i24 Conn. 647, 2 A.zd 2zo (938) ; Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich.
443, 70 N.W.zd 8O (1955); Phelps v. Woodward Constr. Co., 66 Wyo. 33, 204
P.ad 179 (1949).
82 Russell v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 466, 305 P.2d 740 (1956) ; Leveillee v.
Wright, 300 Mass. 382, 15 N.E.2d 247 (1938); Brewer v. Town of Lucedale, %89
Miss. 374, 198 So. 42 (1940); Dulley v. Berkley, 304 S.W.2d 878 (Mo. 1957);
Menth v. Breeze Corp., 4 N.J. 4z8, 73 A.2d 183 (1950).
"'Panagoulis v. Phillip Morris & Co., 95 N.H. 5z4, 68 A.zd 672 (1949); South-
western Greyhound Lines v. Wafer, 208 S.W.zd 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). 4ccord,
United States v. Kelly, 236 F.zd 233 (8th Cir. 1956). These cases closely resemble
those dealt with in the following section. It is little more than a question of semantics
in many instances whether a court declares the negligence of D a contributing cause or
a concurrent cause.
" See Russell v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 466, 305 P.2d 740 (1956); Swank
v. Jordan, 71 So. 2d 737 (La. Ct. App. 1954) ; Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss.
13 1, x6 So. 2d 765 (1944). But see, Smith v. Grubb, 238 N.C. 6651 78 S.E.2d 598
(1953).
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 431.
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(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor of liability because of the man-
ner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm. (Emphasis added.)
Stated more bluntly, if sufficient actual causation is present and there is
no adequate reason ("rule of law") for absolving the first negligent
actor of responsibility, then his negligence will be deemed a legal (proxi-
mate) cause of the resulting harm, and he will be held liable.
A growing number of the jurisdictions which approach the causation
issue positively do so in terms of concurrent negligence86 and concurrent
causation,8 7 completely circumventing the dangerous waters of super-
seding cause."" The first actor is liable if his negligence concurs89 with
the negligence of another in producing the harm. It is usually required
that the negligence of D be in "active operation" at the time of the
harm.90 Exactly what constitutes active operation is not settled, how-
ever.91  For example, in a single jurisdiction, a negligently parked
automobile was in one case held to constitute "operative negligence,"9'2
yet other similar cases have termed such negligence "passive." 98
The concurrent causation theory of liability, by ignoring the unsatis-
factory terminology of proximate cause, avoids the difficulties encoun-
tered in the use of terms such as "efficient cause," "superseding cause,"
and "static" or "remote" negligence. The Restatement contains a con-
servative adaptation of this theory:9
8 6 Wilson v. Edwards, 138 W. Va. 613, 77 S.E.zd 164. (-953).
8 Kelly v. Locke, 58 Ga. 558, 199 S.E. 544 (Ct. App. 1938).
88 Cf., Note 49 MIcH. L. REv. z88 (-95x).
"'Watt v. Comps, 244 Ala. 3, iz So. zd 189 (943); Langston v. Moseley, 223
Ark. 25o, 265 S.W.zd 697 (i954) i Slippery v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, 89 Cal. App.
2d 645, 2o P.2d 543 (i949) i Marion v. Chicago, R. Is. & Pac. Ry., 12 111. App. 2d i,
138 N.E.ad 98 (1956)5 Lindquist v. Des Moines U. Ry., 239 Iowa 356, 30 N.W.2d
120 (1948); Edgarton v. H.P. Welch Co., 321 Mass. 003, 74 N.E.ad 674 (i947)
Tillman v. Bellamy, 242 N.C. 2ol, 87 S.E.ad 253 (1955); Dickerson v. St. Louis Pub.
Serv. Co., 286 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1956) 5 Yandell v. National Fireproofing Corp., 239
N.C. 1, 79 S.E.ad 223 (1953) 5 Benton v. Pellum, 23z S.C. 26, xoo S.E.2d 534 (1957)-
" Cassity v. Brady, 182 Kan. 382, 321 P.2d 171 (1958) ; Parks v. Starks, 342
Mich. 443, 70 N.W.ad 805 (1955). But cf., Dixon v. Kentucky Util. Co., 295 Ky.
32, 174 S.W.2d 19 (43)i Garbe v. Halloran, i5o Ohio St. 476, 83 N.E.ad 217
(1948).
" For example, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has confused the question by
declaring that reasonable foreseeability of intervening act ."causes" the negligence of D
to remain active. Such a deduction is, of course, absurd. See Bradley v. Fowler, 21o
S.C. 232, 42 S.E.2d 234 (1947); Ayers v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 208 S.C. 267,
37 S.E.2d 737.
"'Riddle v. Artis, 243 N.C. 668, 91 S.E.2d 894 (1956).
" Smith v. Grubb, 238 N.C. 665, 78 S.E.zd 598 (1953); Clark v. Lambreth, 235
N.C. 578, 70 S.E.zd 828 (x95-).
" RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 439. This section was followed in Northern Ind. Trans.
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If the effects of the actor's negligent conduct actively and continuously
operate t6 bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and substan-
tially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person's innocent, tor-
tious, or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm
does not protect the actor from liability.
It is not at all clear what is meant by the self-contradictory term "sub-
stantially simultaneous." The comment on the section is of little help,
providing only one example.95
The cases that are decided on the theory of concurrent negligence
deal more closely with the problem of liability in terms of actual causa-
ion than any other group. It is submitted, however, that even in this
type of case the negligent conduct of the first actor renders him liable
only when the court concludes that his negligence was a substantial
factor in producing harm and that other considerations should not bar
recovery.96
CALIFORNIA AND NORTH CAROLINA: A STUDY IN CONTRASTS
The conflicting results reached through the application of different
concepts of proximate cause to cases involving intervening negligent
acts offer conclusive evidence of the need for other criteria of liability.
Decisions in a single jurisdiction are often in direct contradiction. 7 It
has been said that the law is only a prediction of future results which
may be reached by courts. If this is true, there is no law in this area
of negligence.
A comparison of the treatment accorded the problem by the courts
Co. v. Burk, z28 Ind. 16z, 89 N.E.zd 905 (195o); Theurer v. Condon, 34 Wash. zd
448, 209 P.zd 311 (i949).
" "Although in the great majority of cases to which the rule stated in this Section is
applicable, the effects of the conduct of both the actor and the third person are in
simultaneous active operation, it is not necessary that their operations shall be absolutely
simultaneous. It is enough that the two are in substantially simultaneous operation, as
when the effect of the conduct of one or the other has ceased its active operation im-
mediately before the other's conduct takes active effect in harm to the other. RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 439, comment a. Cf., Cassity v. Brady, 18z Kan. 381, 321 P.zd 171
(.9s5).
"Compare Edgarton v. H. P. Welch Co., 321 Mass. 603, 74 N.E.2d 674 (1947);
Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., i Utah 2d 143, 263 P.zd 287 (1953); Theurer v.
Condon, 34 Wash. 2d 448, 209 P.zd 311 (1949), and Phelps v. Woodward Constr. Co.,
66 Wyo. 33, 204 P.zd 179 (1949), qwith Jaggers v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 34 F.
Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1940), and Smith v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 6o5 (E.D. Va.
"957).
"Compare Chadwick v. Popadick, 390 Pa. 511, 136 A.zd 87 (1957), and Coyne
v. Pittsburg Railways Co., 393 Pa. 326, 141 A.2d 830 (x958) (allowing recovery),
,wth Listino v. Union Paving Co., 386 Pa. 32, 124 A.zd 83 (1956).
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of California and North Carolina serves to crystalize. the need for a
re-evaluation of the "law" in this type of case. California undoubtedly
takes a very liberal position in extending the scope of liability." ' The
usual result is that an actor whose negligence in any way contributes to
the plaintiff's harm is held liable.99
In a recent California case,'0" the plaintiff, after alighting from a
bus that had stopped in the middle of the street,101 was struck by a neg-
ligently'0 2 driven automobile as she walked toward the curb.0 3 She
sued the owner of the bus and the motorist. 04 The jury returned a
verdict against the bus owner. The trial court, however, entered judg-
ment n. o. v. The Court of Appeals reversed and entered judgment
for the plaintiff, holding that foreseeability of intervening act was un-
necessary, 0 5 and that the two acts of negligence were concurrent proxi-
"a It is believed that the writings of several eminent authorities in the field of negli-
gence have materially influenced the California courts. See, Prosser, supra note 1i
Carpenter, Proximate Cause, 14 So. CALiF. L. REV. i, x15, 416 (940)5 15 id. 187;
304, 427 (9.r); 16 id. 1, 61, 275 (1948)-
" See Ferroggiaro v. Bowline, 153 Cal. App. 2d 159, 315 P.2d 446 (x957);
Urland v. French, x4i Cal. App. 2d 278, 296 P.2d 518 (x956) 5 Slippery v. San Diego
Yellow Cabs, 89 Cal. App. 2d 645, Zo P.2d 543 (i94.9); McEvoy v. American Pool
Corp., 32 Cal. 2d 295, 195 P.2d 783 (1948).
... Parker v. City & County of San Francisco, r58 Cal. App. 2d 597, 323 P.zd io8
(1958).
10' "The bus was ioY2 feet from the curb at its right .... Its left side was about
nine inches from the center of the street." Id. at 60, 323 P.2d at I1o. The bus driver
was unable to park in the designated unloading zone because a truck was occupying part
of the area. Evidence tended to show that he could have parked closer to the zone
than he did, and that he violated a city ordinance in not parking as close to the curb
"as practicable."
10. The court assumes, without deciding, that the operator of the automobile was
negligent.
"'The plaintiff had just alighted from the front of the bus when she was struck.
10' She also sued the owners of the automobile. A nonsuit was granted in favor of
the automobile owners and the plaintiff dismissed without prejudice her suit against the
automobile driver. The owner and driver of the truck that was parked in the unloading
zone were also original defendants. Plaintiff, for the sum of $40,000, entered into a
covenant with them not to execute.
.. The court states: "If the conduct of the person sought to be charged is a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about the harm, the fact that he neither foresaw nor should
have foreseen the extent and nature of the harm, or the manner in which it occurred,
does not prevent him from being held liable." It then goes on to say that: "Of course,
one could not reasonably foresee that MacKay [the motorist] would lose control of his
automobile and choose to run to the right of the bus rather than into the back of it or
to its left. But certainly it was foreseeable that, if one parked the bus oya feet from
the curb in a street so narrow that traffic proceeding in the same direction was barred,
someone might if he lost control of his car drive to the right rather than to the left of
the bus." Parker v. City & County of San Francisco, 158 Cal. App. 2d 597, 6o7-o8,
3-3 P.2d 1o8; 114-15 (1958).
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mate causes of the plaintiff's injury.1" 6
On the other hand, an even more recent North Carolina case,107
applying the doctrine of "insulated negligence," relieved the first negli-
gent actor of liability. In this case, the complaint alleged that D negli-
gently parked his unlighted automobile on a narrow road at night. The
plaintiff, exercising reasonable care, saw the obstruction created by the
negligence of D, and was able to stop just behind the wrongfully parked
vehicle. Immediately thereafter, a second motorist, who had been
closely following the plaintiff's car, negligently crashed into the rear
of the plaintiff's car, which in turn hit the wrongfully parked car of D.
The trial court entered a default judgment against D.108 The North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court, sus-
taining D's demurrer ore tenus."' 9 The court held as a matter of law
that D, the first negligent actor, was not liable because the intervening
negligent actor "independently and proximately" caused the plaintiff's
harm.11
0
'"°Id. at 61l, 323 P.2d at 117.
... Howze v. McCall, 249 N.C. 250, io6 S.E.2d 236 (1958).
10. The court does not use the term "insulated negligence" in its opinion. It is
apparent, however, that the doctrine is the basis for the decision. Cf., Atlantic Grey-
hound Corp. v. Hunt, 163 F.2d u17 ( 4 th Cir. 1947); Hayes v. City of Wilmington,
243 N.C. 6z8, 91 S.E.zd 673 (1956); Montgomery v. Blades, 2x8 N.C. 68o, 12 S.E.zd
217 (1940)5 Murray v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 218 N.C. 392, 405, 11 S.E.zd 326, 335
(1940) (dissenting opinion) ; Powers v. Sternberg, 213 N.C. 41, x95 S.E. 88 (1938);
Smith v. Sink, 2z N.C. 725, 192 S.E. ioS (937); Williams v. Charles Stores Co.,
209 N.C. 591, 184 S.E. 496 (1936) 5 Hinnant v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 2o2 N.C. 489, x63
S.E. 555 (1932); Comment, Torts-Insulating Negligence in North Carolina, 33
N.C.L. REV. 498 (1955).
Both the driver of the parked car and McCall, the driver of the car that hit plain-
tiff's car, were original defendants. The plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit on his
cause of action against defendant McCall after Lyons failed to answer the complaint
and a judgment by default and inquiry was entered against him.
... The plaintiff appealed the judgment of the trial court, which was for the sum of
$925, assigning various exceptions. The plaintiff's appeal was never ruled on, having
been precluded by the action of the Supreme Court sustaining the defendant's demurrer
ore tenu$.
" Howze v. McCall, 249 N.C. 250, 255, io6 S.E.2d 236, 240 (1958). Chief
Justice Winborne cites three cases in his opinion which he says contain the "controlling
principles." The earliest, McLaney v. Anchor Motor Freight, 236 N.C. 7x4, 74
S.E.zd 36 (1953), merely repeats the "independently and proximately produced" test
laid down in Smith v. Sink, 211 N.C. 725, 192 S.E. xo8 (1937). Hollifield v. Ever-
hart, 237 N.C. 313, 74 S.E.2d 706 (1953), adds nothing. In that case Justice Win-
borne states ". . . the factual situation .. .is similar to that of the McLaney case." It
is submitted that the fact situations of the two cases are markedly different. He repeats
the same "argument" in the third case cited, Hooks v. Hudson, 237 N.C. 695, 75
S.E.2d 759 (1953), and again in the How'ze case. It appears that Chief Justice Win-
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These cases, like many others involving intervening negligence,
are irreconcilable.
CONCLUSION
Many suggestions have been made with respect to the problem
of liability for negligent conduct where intervening negligence con-
tributes to the resulting harm. None have won widespread approval.
The dispensation of Professor Green, that all limitations on liability,
except the requirement of actual causation, should be administered as
part of some issue other than cause,' is certainly a logical starting point
and would be a significant step in the right direction."'- Perhaps the
forth-coming revision of the Restatement will offer a solution to this
perplexing problem."3 So long as the issue of liability is determined in
terms of causation, we can only speculate over the outcome of cases
involving intervening negligent acts.
borne in these cases is attempting to build up a line of decisions based not upon legal
principles, but upon some policy that allows no more than a single wrongdoer to be held
liable in cases of multiple causation in which one negligent act follows another. The
court rationalizes that the two negligent acts were not concurrent because there would
have been no harm to the plaintiff but for the negligence of the driver of the automobile
following the plaintiff. This rationalization is grossly ineffective because, while it is
true as a statement of fact, it can be as easily said that there would have been no harm
to the plaintiff but for the negligence of the defendant. See, e.g., CJ.S. Negligence
§i i n. 33 (1950).
The Ho'wze decision, as well as those cited as authority, does not so much as men-
tion the concept of foreseeability, which has been long accepted in North Carolina as the
principal test of proximate cause. See note 27 supra. It is submitted that the Houw
decisions are contrary to the great weight of authority in North Carolina. See, e.g.,
Price v. Gray, 24.6 N.C. 162, 97 S.E.2d 844. (1957)5 Riddle v. Arts, 243 N.C. 668,
91 S.E.2d 894 (1956); Hayes v. City of Wilmington, 243 N.C. 525, 91 S.E.zd 673
(1956); Graham v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 240 N.C. 338, 87 S.E.zd 346 (x954.); Baum-
gardner v. Allison Fence Co., 236 N.C. 698, 74 S.E.2d (953); Riggs v. Akers Motor
Lines, 233 N.C. 16o, 63 S.E.zd 197 (195i) ; Banks v. Shepard, 230 N.C. 86, 52 S.E.zd
215 (1949) i Caulder v. Gresham, 224 N.C. 402, 30 S.E.2d 312 (1944); Montgomery
v. Blades, 218 N.C. 68o, x2 S.E.2d 217 (940) ; Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 6
S.E.2d 8o8 (1940) ; Kiser v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 2z6 N.C. 698, 6 S.E.2d 713
(1940); Smith v. Sink, 21o N.C. 815, 188 S.E. 631 (1936) ; White v. Carolina Realty
Co., xS N.C. 536, 1o9 S.E. 564 (1921).
... GREEN, op. cit. supra note 79, at 200.
... Dean Green's treatment of the subject is by far the most rational, the most under-
standable, and the most worthwhile work in the field. It is as pertinent today as it was
thirty years ago, perhaps more so. Any attempt to condense or capsule his analysis of
the problem at this point would not do justice to his superb presentation. Rather, the
book is unequivocally endorsed and supported.
... Cf., RESTATEMENT, TORTS § z±i and comments, especially comment h (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1958).
